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Abstract

Considerable controversy surrounds the issue of whether a revaluation of the Chinese currency would help the performance of the US manufacturing sector. It is felt by some that China's currency policies have been in part responsible for eliminating manufacturing jobs in the US, while placing downward pressure on manufacturing wages and output growth. This paper assesses these claims by looking at macroeconomic data on US manufacturing employment, output, and real compensation. It is found that the Chinese yuan does have a statistically significant effect on employment and output growth, but these effects are small in magnitude and thus inconsequential. It is also found that increases in the value of the Chinese yuan lower real hourly compensation in US manufacturing by reducing the purchasing power of the vast majority of workers who retain their jobs. The general conclusion of the paper is that US officials would be better advised to seek market opening initiatives, since exports are found to have a consistently stronger effect on manufacturing performance than general movements in the RMB.









Estimating the Effects of a Chinese Yuan Appreciation
on US Manufacturing Output, Employment, and Wages

I.  Introduction

The secular decline in employment in US manufacturing, coupled with the stupendous rise in US trade deficits with China, has made China a perennial target for certain US officials' condemnations, with accusations that China is supporting its growth and expansion at the expense of the American manufacturing worker. The importation of relatively cheap Chinese manufactured goods, both producer and consumer items, are held by these people to be responsible for eliminating high paying, high valued-added manufacturing jobs, along with the acceleration of a general deindustrialization of the US and a rising fear among some of long term American economic stagnation and decline.

The case of China is perplexing, multifaceted, and quite unlike that of Japan and Taiwan during the 1980s. In the past, Japan's surplus with the US was concentrated in a few sectors with over 30% of its surplus due to automobiles. Taiwan's surplus with the US was likewise mainly due to electronics, which the US dealt with through Taiwan's imposition of voluntary export restraints, as well as its self-regulation by industrial and manufacturing associations, and trade-based memoranda of understanding. By contrast, China's exports to the US are now spread among a myriad of industries and firms, and these firms do not receive direct aid or overt protection from the government. They are small scale, highly agile and innovative, and enjoy substantial cost advantages over their foreign rivals. The anonymous and highly dispersed nature of such competition has forced the US to abandon any efforts to identify specific Chinese companies or groups of firms as the cause of its deteriorating manufacturing employment. That would clearly be infeasible. Instead, the US government has focused attention on the Chinese government's broad macroeconomic policies and in particular the policy of maintaining what some in the US believe is an undervalued renminbi (hereafter RMB). There have been quite loud and vociferous calls for China to allow its RMB/USD exchange rate to freely float to a level that would better reflect market fundamentals. Those making such calls presumably feel that it would ameliorate the trade imbalance and would improve US manufacturing performance, despite the fact that it would also hurt the American consumer and reduce capital inflow.

The Chinese government and its supporters in academia have understandably not been passive in their reaction to American calls for a freeing of the RMB market. Control of the RMB is merely thought to be part of the larger issue of sovereignty – or perhaps part of general monetary and fiscal policy; something few would claim should be designed with foreign welfare in mind. Beyond this, there have been serious claims that the RMB is not undervalued or that it is being held stable relative to a basket of currencies. In still other settings it has been argued that a rising RMB would not alleviate the imbalances in trade due to low elasticities of demand for such goods, or due to competitive pressures from other countries, or due to a lack of national saving on the part of Americans. 

This paper is concerned with determining whether calls for revaluation of the RMB are empirically justified. That is, based on past aggregate, time series data, to what extent would a stronger RMB, vis-a-vis the USD, result in significant and meaningful increases in US manufacturing employment, output, and real wages. There is a strong presumption if markets work then movements in relative international prices, as influenced by exchange rates, can equilibrate the large imbalances seen in bilateral trade between the US and China. According to this view, the value of the RMB should be important in rectifying such imbalances in trade. If the US has industries that directly compete with Chinese firms, a rising RMB will expand output, employment and real wages.  For industries that do not compete directly with the Chinese, a rising RMB can provide Chinese with purchasing power that expands US exports of goods to China and again works to eliminate the trade deficit. 

No expressly normative argument is made here for freeing up the RMB.  Instead, a series of counterfactual, statistical arguments are presented asking whether a stronger RMB would indeed lead to higher output, employment, and wages in US manufacturing. 

The structure of the paper is as follows. Section II surveys recent research on whether the Chinese RMB is currently undervalued relative to the USD. In addition, consideration is taken of studies that have tried to assess the impact of China's imports on US manufacturing. Section III presents a simple theoretical framework to guide the specification of empirical models to be tested and clarifies three important factors that impact on US manufacturing, including the importation of manufactured goods. Section IV introduces several empirical models that are then used to gauge the importance of the RMB on US manufacturing performance. Section V concludes the paper. 

II.  A Short Review of the Literature

The notion of a secular trade-induced decline of US manufacturing has been around for many decades.  It was a prominent during the 1970s and 1980s when Japan was singled out as the major factor in the destruction of US manufacturing jobs in steel and automobiles. During the 1980s it was asserted that the Japanese were competing unfairly in steel, automobiles, electronics, and house appliances and were systematically acquiring US know-how that would eventually lead to a permanently weak and enfeebled US manufacturing sector. Even prominent economists from MIT took a stand in defense of a core of US manufacturing which must be kept healthy to serve as a basis for the real economy. Worry about this deindustrialization by design was put on hold beginning in 1991 when it became clear that the  US was still the preeminent national economy in the world and Japan began its decent into a lost decade.  
Deindustrialization nevertheless continued to be a topic of concern to many economists who attempted to categorize the various causes for the decline in the percentage employment in manufacturing. Kollmeyer (2009) explains deindustrialization as a natural process of rising affluence. Thus, a rise in wealth leads households to turn to services rather than durables, causing that sector of the economy to increase and thus lower employment in the manufacturing sector. Rowthorn and Coutts (2004) provide a clear set of reasons for the deindustrialization seen in developing countries including domestic outsourcing of services; changes in consumption patterns (with falling relative prices leading to smaller shares of manufactures in GDP); growth of productivity in manufacturing; trade displacements; and changes in the percentage of investment in GDP . Their argument on productivity growth is illuminating since it states that manufacturing productivity growth is higher than that of services and therefore services require more labor over time to maintain output levels. This reduces labor used in manufacturing as a percentage of the whole. Rowthorn (1994) has emphasized the role of productivity as the main driver of deindustrialization. He finds less evidence that manufacturing performance declines in response to trade with developing countries. Montesor and Marzetti (2011) provide evidence that deindustrialization is not simply an "appeared phenomenon" where an outsourcing of services to firms outside of manufacturing (both domestic and foreign) reduces manufacturing employment and increases service employment. Rich (2010) agrees that trade is not clearly causing a destruction of jobs in manufacturing, but outsourcing may be partly responsible.  Nickell, Redding, and Swaffield (2008) do not appear to give much emphasis to trade in explaining deindustrialization of developed countries. For them deindustrialization is not well understood with complicated dynamics, caused in part by employment protection policies. Overall, these authors stress that much of deindustrialization is due to productivity growth, changes in relative prices, and changes in education. 

Despite the fact that many of these authors do not find trade to be the main cause of deindustrialization, controversy again arose at the start of the 21st century with the stupendous rise in China's economy and the concomitant rise in US bilateral trade deficits with the PRC. As these trade deficits widened and US manufacturing employment continued to fall in large numbers, especially after 2001, there were renewed calls for action against what was seen as predatory Chinese practices against US manufacturing business – in particular, currency manipulation. Chan (2010) has reported that the IMF has been feeble in responding to currency issues that are needed to correct imbalances between surplus countries (China and Germany) and deficit countries (US and UK).  China has likewise attempted to defuse tensions over the RMB by using a slow appreciation. US Treasury Geithner is characterized by Chan as believing that China is purposely blocking an appreciation of the RMB. This view has become commonplace among many observers in the US that the Chinese are strategically boosting their market share in the US by keeping the value of the USD high relative to the RMB. 

In fact, China has become a manufacturing hub for many Asian nations who feed imports into China, process them using cheap labor, and then export these on to developed countries such as the US and Europe. Over the past decade, large collective current account surpluses that countries such as South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan had experienced with the US were brought together very prominently and channeled through China—making China an easy target for American animosity and controversy.  The US government has become more and more aggressive about dealing with what it perceives as a Chinese manipulation of its currency. Frankel and Wei ( 2007) have studied the behavior of the US Treasury in naming currency manipulators and have found that the Treasury is motivated in part out of large trade deficits with those countries named. Nevertheless, Hale and Hale (2008) take the position that revaluation is the wrong approach to take with the Chinese arguing that 27% of Chinese exports are ultimately generated by US corporations (through OEM and the like); that China's surplus is balanced by a regional deficits; that currency appreciation would make imports cheaper and may lead to greater exports; and that internal reforms are more important than currency realignments. However, Morrison (2010) provides a complete discussion of US-China trade disputes and lists Congressional legislation proposed to force China to revalue its currency – including parts of such bills as S. 1586, HR 2378, S. 1027, S. 1254, and S. 3134. As an aside, Johnson (2009) provides a rather peculiar testimony before a Congressional committee dealing with the impact of Chinese trade on US manufacturing since absolutely no mention is made of China or trade at all.

The controversy, in both private and governmental circles that has arisen, has led to an outpouring of research on the RMB's effect on the US economy and the level of the RMB that would most likely eliminate the bilateral trade deficit with the US. 

Baugh and Yudken (2006) assert that trade is costing American jobs without providing much evidence. They then use this as a basis to advocate pro-union changes to US economic policy and an extension of labor rights to countries such as China. They are particularly worried that even large high-tech manufacturing works, such as the production of the Boeing 787 will eventually be largely farmed out to Chinese workers, something that seems highly unlikely. Bernard (2009) highlights the negative effects that trade has had on Canadian manufacturing jobs. Up to one in seven jobs were lost during the period 2004 – 2008. Textiles and clothing have been particularly hard hit.  There has also been a large and important migration of manufacturing firms from Canada to China.  The Canadian experience has a direct bearing on the fate of US manufacturing firms due to their proximity and similarity in wage levels, etc. Edwards and Lawrence (2010) found that Chinese manufactured have resulted in lower manufacturing prices, but this has not caused greater wage inequality as would be expected if factor price equalization was at work. They claim this indicates that Chinese and US manufactured goods may be quite different and therefore do not substitute well with each other.  Fair (2010) employs a multi-country econometric model to determine the effect on both the US economy and the Chinese economy of a rise in the value of the RMB. He finds that US output and employment rise, but the effects are modest in size. Griswold (1999) makes a strong case for free and open trade, asserting that in 1994 only 12% of American manufacturing workers were in industries that were exposed to imports totaling 30% or more of total output in that industry.  The vast majority of workers in the US are employed in sectors that are only marginally involved in trade.  These workers benefit most from low priced products from China and would be hurt by an increase in the RMB. Yu (2010), on the other hand, employed a large scale gravity model to show that a rise in the RMB would have a substantial effect on Chinese export to the US.  The study however has several unexpected results, including the fact that when fixed effects are introduced, US GDP appears to have no statistically significant effect on US imports from China. In addition, there does not appear to be any discussion of how a rising RMB would impact on US exports to China, which might be thought to be even more important in helping to balance trade and raise US manufacturing employment. 

Despite a divergence of opinion regarding how much influence the RMB exerts on US manufacturing, there has been considerable interest in trying to estimate the level of RMB that would generate a current account balance for China, and in particular the level that would eliminate the large bilateral trade surplus with the US.  Since trade between China and the US is dominated by manufactures, it is thought that rebalancing would have a positive effect on US manufacturing performance. 

Bergsten (2010a) and Bergsten (2010b) sees the RMB as 20% undervalued and has been vociferously advocating the application of pressure on the Chinese government to raise the RMB 8-10% per year.   Cheung, Chinn and Fujii (2010) have provided a large survey of estimates ranging from a high of 50-67% to a low of 0-12%.  Cline (2010) feels that a regional appreciation of currencies would be more effective at reducing China's current account surplus with the US with a 10% revaluation in the RMB resulting in a low of $22 billion reduction in the surplus to a high of $ 63 billion. Thorbecke (2010) also believes that the structure of China's trade, with 2/3's of imports coming from East Asia to be processed for export, requires a broad, regional appreciation in order to see a balancing of  its current account. Goldstein and Lardy (2006) estimate that the RMB was 20-40% undervalued during 2005 and made a prominent call for an immediate revaluation of 10% in the value of the RMB relative to the USD. By contrast, Qin and He (2010) more recently use time series data and find that China's real exchange rate (calculated by using the ratio of CPI figures) is not at all undervalued.  Tyers and Zhang ( 2011) make the case that the Belassa-Samuelson framework is inapplicable in judging the valuation of the RMB during the 1997 – 2004 period due to excessive saving and capital outflow on the part of China.  Ma and McCauley (2011) have commented on the desirability of a common appreciation of the RMB among the major trading countries of Asia as a form of regional monetary cooperation. McKinnon (2006) has remained adamant in supporting a continued fixing of the RMB to the USD since an appreciation that is foreseen could create a liquidity trap that would render China's monetary policy ineffective. Morrison and Labonte (2010) take a very conventional view of the RMB noting that an appreciation would likely reduce China's bilateral surplus with the US, but should only be done in concert with domestic structural changes that would stimulate domestic consumption and offer employment to displaced workers and manufacturing output.  They also realize that the US is partly responsible for the bilateral deficit through its continued lack of national saving. Sato, Shimzu, and Zhang (2010) use a supply side framework to estimate the equilibrium RMB-USD exchange rate for China and find that it is considerably undervalued and should rise by 65% from its 2000 level.  This estimate agrees with the largest of estimates within the literature on the undervaluation of the RMB. Subramanian (2010) applies the PPP framework and finds strong evidence of a 30% undervaluation of the RMB, but there is much to be desired in using the PPP method, which is known to suffer a great many faults. Whalley and Wang (2011) use a computable general equilibrium model to analyze the effect of a reevaluation of the RMB on trade flows and trade surplus.  They find a strong effect of revaluation on both, but particularly on the surplus, However, their results depend crucially on the degree of substitutability of domestic production for foreign production in consumer demand. This is precisely the problem, it is difficult to assess how much US consumers would react to higher prices on Chinese goods and whether US production is a close substitute.  Xing (2010) has found very little effect of an RMB revaluation on the bilateral trade balance. Econometrically, it is difficult to determine the effect of an appreciation on trade since past appreciation has been slow, predictable, and minute. 

III.  Some Theoretical Considerations

There exist a set of  traditional ways to approach the issue of measuring the effect of a currency appreciation (i.e. the RMB) on a foreign industry (i.e. US manufacturing). One approach would model the microeconomic objectives and constraints and then explicitly derive the expected effects of an appreciation as a by-product of the optimization process. However, this approach assumes that there is high frequency data at a detailed microeconomic level – something that is unlikely to exist for the case of China. The analysis is also invariably partial equilibrium in practice since the microeconomic aspects of the model cannot be easily extended to other levels of economy and other countries, many of which are also involved in trade with the industry both domestically and internationally. This places limits on the idea that a feasible model can be built up from rational maximizing behavior at the individual firm level. An additional problem is that the representative firm is so generic that it often fails to capture any of the important features of real life firms, such as aggregation constraints, risk and uncertainty, product qualities, name brands, regulation, marketing costs, transportation and insurance, strategic planning, and many other attributes that remain comfortably under the surface at a macroeconomic level

An alternative approach would abandon the fiction of a stable, generic representative firm, which is involved in maximizing profits, in favor of an aggregate model that is built from known macroeconomic equilibrium relations or identities. There are many examples of this in macroeconomics, such as the familiar equation of exchange from monetary theory; the Keynesian cross from macroeconomics; balance of payments models from international finance; and Gordon's stock-bond arbitrage equation from stock valuation theory. In each case, a well known, generally accepted identity, definition, or arbitrage relation is chosen. Then, actual and desired quantities are distinguished – with actual quantities coming from the identity or definition and desired quantities coming from flexible theoretical considerations. In some cases, an explicit optimization model can be used to derive the desired quantities and at other times, when the sheer number of variables in play become impossible to handle within a single optimization model, these variables can be entered in a general way into the model. All that is needed is an intuitive path between the data and the desired variable in the identity. 

We adopt the second type of methodology spoken of above and begin by writing the definition of average labor productivity as

                                                     (1)

where y = average labor productivity, Y = real manufacturing output, E = total labor employed in producing Y and measured in terms of persons, and H = average hours per employee over the observation period. Taking natural logs and solving this for E in terms of the other variables results in 


                                                                           (2)

We next breathe life into this accounting relation by assuming that the desired, as opposed to actual, hours H can be written as

                                                                          (3)

where  is a linear combination of other variables that affect H. The last variable  is a random variable representing all other minor forces that have not been specified. 

Substituting this H function into (2) above yields

            (4)    

Solving this last equation for ln(E) we can write the regression model as

    (5)

It should be noted that this regression equation suffers from the same problem all highly aggregated equilibrium econometric models have – namely simultaneous equations bias.​[1]​ 

Next, consider the issue of real compensation to labor in manufacturing. For manufacturing firms, there is at least some rough evidence that labor cost as a percentage of total cost will normally be between 45-60%, not only for the US, but among a wide variety of countries. 
Assuming the variation in the desired form of this ratio for the US is relatively small over the period of observation, and that it responds to a particular set of variables, we can write



where  = total nominal compensation to labor, P = price of output, and  =  = ratio of total cost to total revenue. As before, distinguishing between actual and desired quantities, the relation in (6) can be transformed into a regression as

          (7)

where  represents a linear combination of other variables which might impact on the real compensation of labor. 

Finally, manufacturing output can be analyzed by again starting with an identity


   (8)

where  = domestic demand for manufacturing (including changes in inventories),  = the exports of manufactures, and = the import of manufactures. Equation (8) is of paramount importance in the controversy over whether Chinese imports are in fact displacing American domestic manufacturing output. It also shows how that exports can be important in offsetting any displacement that may be occurring due to such imports. Beyond this, there is a structural issue concerning whether or not the US public is spending more as a percentage of its of its disposable income on services and less on manufactured goods. A country's economy as it matures will naturally experience a rapidly expanding service sector over time.

We can rewrite (8) as



where  = net exports of manufactured goods and where  is again a desired quantity depending numerous variables, X,  including the exchange rate and GDP. 

Taking logs of both sides and substituting desired for actual quantities allows us to write the regression equation for manufacturing output Y as

                                 (10) 

where  is a linear combination of other variables that are expected to impact on Y through two of the three channels found on the right hand side of (9). 

IV.  Estimation and Results

The basic regressions that have been developed in the previous section, to assess the importance of changes in the value of the RMB on US manufacturing employment, real compensation, and output, are shown in equations (5), (7), and (10), respectively. The implicit assumption being made about these equations is that they are stable over time, meaning the population parameters are relatively unchanged, as are the structural relations. However, cointegration tests were run on the equations and it was found that none of the equations displayed sufficient stability to warrant use of standard cointegration and error correction analysis. Instead, the variables were differenced (eliminating any potential unit root problems) and autoregressive models were then fit to these differenced variables.​[2]​ The result was a relatively tight fit with strong parameter stability. Because of the possible presence of autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity, both unadjusted and HAC-adjusted t-tests are provided in the tables for comparison. 

Data is readily available from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the St. Louis Federal Reserve databank FRED, and from National Bureau of Statistics of China (which ultimately provides CPI data on China). All monthly data have been converted to quarterly averages.  Monthly data exists for many of the variables, but higher frequency data are not available for GDP.  In addition, higher frequency data requires considerable sophistication in modeling the dynamics, seasonality, and lags in effect. By contrast, the effect of exchange rate movements is less burdened by dynamic considerations when quarterly data are used. The term RMB refers to the number of Chinese yuan (CNY) that exchange for one USD​[3]​. Thus, a rise in the RMB exchange rate is in fact a rise in the value of the USD, as we have defined things. It will be useful to keep in mind that the Chinese foreign exchange rate discussed in the paper is merely the value of the USD in terms of the Chinese yuan.

To ease the exposition of results, the relevant regressions have been placed into groups for comparison. Tables 1-A, 1-B, 1-C and 1-D (hereafter Group Tables 1) are concerned with the specification of manufacturing employment, as in equation (5) above. Group Tables 2 and 3 are similarly concerned with real manufacturing compensation (wages plus benefits) and manufacturing output, respectively. We note that the construction of an accurate real exchange rate is problematic, due to lack of comprehensive data on tradable goods and services for both countries. As a result, tables A and B of each of the Group Tables use nominal values for purposes of comparison. For the period, 1994-2010 relative CPI indexes are used to construct a functional real exchange rate, but it should be noted that this data is probably contaminated with heavy measurement error, not to mention the fact that it spuriously includes numerous non-tradable goods and services. Indeed, it is argued in this paper that most Chinese consumers are unable to purchase the majority of American goods, making the notion of PPP rather quaint in this context – despite the fact that much controversy surrounds the movement in such real rates. Variables were log-differenced when such differencing seemed natural. Numerous regressions and specifications were run and a portion of these are shown in tables below. Out of this large set of regressions a number of recurring features and stylized facts were observed, some of which were statistically significant according to Neyman-Pearson testing and others which were not statistically significant, but nevertheless interesting in signs and magnitudes. 

( i ) Employment Results

Regressions presented in Group Tables 1 show the effects of several variables on the growth in US manufacturing employment.  Note that the dependent variable refers to the number of employees in manufacturing and not to employee hours or the percentage of total employment in manufacturing, The most important results that are implied by these tables are as follows – 

Employment growth appears to be most consistently sensitive to output (+) and productivity (-) growth. The signs are as expected and are certainly statistically significant. These two variables regressed alone account for 81% of the variation in employment. The remaining variation is due entirely to changes in average work hours and to measurement errors. Thus, if average working hours were constant and there were no measurement errors to speak of, the regression would revert to a deterministic identity and the R2 would be 1. The regressions in Group Table 1 therefore assume that there exist variables that affect the desired average number of working hours, which in turn varies over time. Both growth in output and productivity have strong effects. For example, a doubling of the growth in industrial production would add half that amount to employment growth (which is close to the Okun's coefficient for the US)  

The business cycle indicator variable does not appear to have a significant effect on the growth in manufacturing employment, independent of the output growth and productivity growth factors mentioned above. This might indicate that, aside from direct movements in output, the business cycle does not affect employment through a strong expectations or confidence effect. One important difficulty encountered with this variable is that, for most regressions, the period of observation is 1994 – 2010 and therefore there are only two recessions that appear in the data over this observational period. 
 
Changes in the composition of consumption, as represented by movements in the percentage of consumption devoted to durables, does not have a statistically significant effect on the growth in manufacturing employment. Part of this may have to due with the fact that a rising durable market gives rise to a strong service sector designed to service the durable – for example, autos, cell phones, computers, etc. Services to durables, which may be outsourced, may rise faster than the durable market and cause a reduction of employment in the durable manufacturing sector.  In any event, this variable does not generally bear a strong relation to movement to any of the three variables we are considering; namely employment, real compensation, or output. Much has been made in the literature about the rise of the service sector and how this impacts adversely on the manufacturing sector, but this is hard to separate out from the other factors involved, such as output.

The value of the USD relative to the RMB is a statistically significant variable in determining the value of manufacturing growth, but only when exports are excluded from the equation. Regressions with both variables included have been omitted for brevity. If exports are included in the equation, the value of the dollar ceases to be significant. One possible reason for this is that the effect of changes in the RMB-USD exchange rate seems to be centered on exports and not on imports. The value of the USD continues to have a negative coefficient, but it is not longer significant when used in conjunction with total real exports. That is, a rise in the US dollar reduces employment in US manufacturing principally by reducing exports of US firms to China. If both imports and exports were separately impacted, we would expect to see both the value of the dollar and exports remain significant variables when both explanatory variable are present. This is not the case. This result is important since it says that concern about Chinese imports are somewhat misplaced.  Concern should be instead focused on the extent to which movements in the RMB could induce greater exports to China – something which would go a long way in reducing the trade imbalance that is giving rise to controversy. 

Another interesting aspect of this result is that it does not matter whether one uses the nominal exchange rate or the real exchange rate, the effect remains negative.  That is, a faster rise in the value of the RMB tends to increase US manufacturing employment growth.  However, the size of this effect is not particularly large. One reason why that the effect seems muted is that if the rise in the RMB is subdued, trended, and therefore well expected, then it will likely have little effect on China's exports to the US and imports from the US. This is analogous to the testing of the effectiveness of a new drug, where the drug is administered in equal and highly controlled amounts, but nevertheless in doses that are much too small to make a difference. Observations will show that the drug is hardly effective at all, and in some cases we may find that patients worsen under the treatment.​[4]​ Antibiotics given in excessively small amounts may be totally ineffective in curing a patient and can in some cases make the situation worse. This is not to say that the RMB must go through a sizeable revaluation simply to satisfy our curiosity. But, it does point to the inherent difficulties in econometrically assessing the effectiveness of the RMB when changes in the RMB are so small. 

The short run elasticity (at means) for changes in the value of the USD relative to the RMB is incredibly small, even when we find a statistically significant effect. A doubling of the growth rate in the value of the RMB (which would be taking it from roughly 2.5% per year to 5% per year) would add about 16 basis points of additional growth in US manufacturing employment (i.e. -2.5% multiplied to -0.0062 from Table 1-A column 4) . This would be like taking the rough average decline in US manufacturing employment of -3.16% per year and making it -3.0% per annum instead. A positive development, but inconsequential in practical terms. Thus, the view that a revaluation of the RMB might help bring about a radical change in employment in US manufacturing is without any basis, if this research is valid. By contrast, real exports have a much stronger short run effect on manufacturing employment growth, as seen in Table 1-B.  The effect is roughly four times as large as the effect of an RMB appreciation. Increasing US exports to China could have a much stronger effect on employment growth.

These elasticities assume that all other factors remain constant during the period. The upshot of this is that the US should not focus attention on a controversial revaluation of the RMB, but should instead consider more congenial steps of market opening that would allow more Chinese to enjoy US manufactured goods, provided the policy goal is to create more US manufacturing jobs.  

( ii ) Real Compensation of Labor

Group Table 2 deals with the real compensation of labor in US manufacturing.  The dependent variable in all three regressions is the growth rate of real compensation, including both wages and benefits.  Unlike the other equations, the equation for real compensation has a much lower R2 statistic, indicating that there are many idiosyncratic factors at work in determining the growth of real compensation for manufacturing workers. 

Among the factors considered in Group Table 2, the most important variables by far are again productivity and output growth, as one might expect. Regressions on these two variables alone result in an R2 of 0.19, with the signs on both productivity (+) and output growth (-) both as expected. The second of these is related to a larger macroeconomic issue of countercyclical wages. Given the growth of productivity for labor, higher output is expected to be associated with lower real wages.  This was predicted by Keynes in 1936 and his prediction subsequently became the focus of an intense debate and controversy.  Our regressions in Group Table 2 confirm Keynes' prediction of the countercyclical nature of real wages. 

The value of the USD in terms of the RMB is estimated to have a positive relation with the growth of real compensation. This might seem counter-intuitive, but a higher USD means that wages earned by employees buys more, especially if there are many goods being imported at lower exchange-adjusted prices from China. Naturally, there is the issue of factor price equalization which would normally operate to reduce wages to be more in line with wages in China.  However, low priced imports from China make the real value of US manufacturing wages higher than they would be otherwise. This result is very important as it shows that many workers in manufacturing would in fact be hurt by a US dollar that weakens.  Looked at in this way, millions of workers in manufacturing would keep their jobs, even in the face of a stronger US dollar. Moreover, these workers will experience a rising average real wage as the dollar strengthens due to an increase in the purchasing power of their nominal wage. That is, with some workers losing their jobs on the margin and overall employment being hurt, the vast bulk of employees in US manufacturing will gain from the higher purchasing power of their wage.  This argument is similar to the effect of a rise in the minimum wage.  There is no doubt that a rising minimum wage causes unemployment on the margin, but for the much greater set of workers who retain their job after the wage hike, they experience a higher real wage and therefore benefit.  

(iii) Manufacturing Output

With respect to growth in manufacturing, the growth in US real GDP has an expectedly profound effect, as shown in Group Table 3.  This is due to the increase in demand for manufactures, both producer and consumer goods, that occurs when real GDP rises. Over 60% of the variation in in the growth of manufacturing output can be explained by this single variable. Addition of other explanatory variables raises this an additional 15% of the variation in output growth. The real value of the USD in terms of the RMB has the expected sign and an elasticity (at means) of about 0.10, which is very low but considerably larger than the similar elasticity for employment growth. A weaker USD – stronger RMB leads to a growth in US manufacturing output.  Again, we find that if real growth in US exports is added to the equation, the elasticity on the real value of the dollar drops by 1/3 and the coefficient becomes statistically insignificant. Interestingly, if we begin with the unadorned basic regression using only the growth in real GDP and then add in the growth in the value of the dollar, the R2 rises about 5% and the USD-RMB variable is statistically significant. Adding real exports then increases R2 by another 5% but the coefficient on the value of the USD-RMB drops by 1/3 and becomes insignificant. This appears to be evidence of a separate and weak effect of the RMB on manufacturing output growth, but still export growth dominates. One reason for this is probably that export growth has much greater variation than does movements in the USD-RMB exchange rate. This allows its effect to be estimated more precisely. Yet another problem is that the Chinese government may seek to defuse trade animosities between itself and Washington by both slowly appreciating the RMB while at the same time increasing purchases (e.g. government procurements, etc.) of US exports.  If this is true, then it may be difficult separating the effect of a rising RMB from a rising quantity of imports from the US. Both will be occurring during the period of adjustment and both will have an effect on US manufacturing output growth.   

V.  Conclusions

The appropriate value of the RMB has become a focal point of controversy between the US and China. Many observers in the US claim that China is continuing to protect its manufacturing base and expand it current account surplus by artificially keeping the value of the RMB low relative to the US dollar. They assert that a substantial revaluation of the RMB would help to reduce China's bilateral trade surplus with the US and this would foster higher output, employment and real wages in the US manufacturing sector. The common view among these researchers is that the RMB should appreciate between 12% to 60%, depending on the analysis used.  China has responded in many ways, partly by allowing a slow and steady revaluation and partly by arguing among other things that revaluation of the RMB will not balance trade flows since the US-China imbalance is caused by many other factors, including a lack of saving on the part of Americans. 

This paper uses highly aggregated time series data on US manufacturing to assess the claim that a rise in the RMB (or a fall in the USD) would significantly ameliorate US manufacturing performance, especially with regard to growth in employment, real wages, and output.  A number of results were found.  

First, there is evidence that a rise in the RMB has a positive and statistically significant relation on employment growth in US manufacturing.  However, this relation is not large in magnitude and therefore is economically inconsequential, given past movements in the RMB. However, it is possible that larger movements in the RMB might generate even larger percentage movements in the growth of US employment. But, since no such movements have been forthcoming since 1994, it is impossible to identify how that employment would react to larger increases in the value of the Chinese yuan. 

Second, granted that increases in the RMB might increase employment in US manufacturing, these effects are dwarfed by much larger effects if growth of US exports are included in the regressions. That is, autonomous increases in exports appear to be more important than currency revaluations, meaning that market opening initiatives for China may have much larger effects on US employment than a simple increase in the RMB. A stronger RMB probably helps Chinese buy American products, but this is not obvious when exports are excluded from the regressions. Barriers to American products are probably more important to Chinese consumers than the value of the RMB. This fits well into the notion that Chinese households are saving at very high rates. The upshot here is that the trade imbalance is probably influenced more by marketing channels – smooth and open from China to US and difficult and narrow from US to China – than by any undervaluation of the RMB. Viewed in this way, the barriers to marketing channels are a significant part of the full price of US products to Chinese, even after correction by a possible undervalued RMB.  

Third, both output growth and productivity growth have profound effects on the growth of employment in US manufacturing – far greater than anything that could be achieved by revaluation of the RMB. Variations in output growth, especially over the business cycle have an enormous influence on employment, while growth of productivity has a clear inverse relation with employment growth.  This is as we would expect and confirms what many have claimed is going on in most of the developed countries of the world. Thus, much of the pain in US manufacturing is due to the business cycle and normal growth in productivity. 

Fourth, the growth in real compensation of US manufacturing workers is negatively related to the value of the RMB (positively related to the value of the USD).  Essentially this can be explained by saying that a rise in the RMB is associated with a fall in the value of the USD.  Those workers in manufacturing who retain their jobs must buy goods (many of which are imported from China) at a higher price due to the falling USD and this lowers the real wage they are paid. We should note that this is fully aggregated manufacturing data and that there may very well be differing effects on certain sub-industries within the overall manufacturing industry, especially those small sets of sub-industries that are in direct competition with Chinese imports. More detailed US data needs to be considered to make a definitive statement about real compensation. 

Fifth, the growth in real compensation to manufacturing workers is strongly related to the growth in productivity, showing that productivity growth is a two-edged sword which eliminates employment in manufacturing on the one hand while raising real compensation for those who retain their jobs on the other hand. 
 
Sixth, there is a small bit of evidence that revaluation of the RMB would promote greater growth in manufacturing output, but this is again overwhelmed by real export growth when exports enter the regression. Like employment, market opening initiative appear to be a better means of spurring output growth in the future, compared with increases in the RMB.  This view however is based on historical movements in the RMB and cannot help in determining what might happen if the RMB were to rise substantially. 

The overall results of this empirical study seem to indicate that US officials, researchers, and commentators who are making strong calls for revaluation of the RMB are focusing on the wrong channel of influence and should instead be looking to better open China's vast consumer and producer markets to American goods.  As China's marketing structure modernizes and domestic firms arise with a national reach, US manufacturers should consider utilizing these firms through joint ventures to help market their products to Chinese consumers. This is not to say that RMB valuations are not important, but such revaluations are more likely to benefit Chinese macroeconomic, banking, and financial stability rather than make substantial changes in the bilateral trade imbalance with the US. 
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^1	  An example of this is single equation estimation of real money demand that typically treats real income and the interest rate as exogenous and independent relative to the regression error term, despite the fact that that these are in fact endogenous in larger economic models of the economy.
^2	  This is a standard fallback whenever cointegration fails (see Hill et. al. (2008) pp. 340-341 ) .  The failure to find statistcially significant cointegration does not preclude a stable regression existing in differenced variables. The regressions are run without error correction terms (in levels).  It does mean that there is no apparent long run relation between the time series in levels. The lack of cointegration is probably due to the fact that there are so few observations being used over a period when the economy is undergoing considerable structural change – something to which the differenced variables can nevertheless adapt.
^3	  The RMB is the formal name of the Chinese currency, while the Chinese yuan refers to the units which the RMB is denominated. This is somewhat like calling the USD the "greenback" and saying it is denominated in dollars. 
^4	  In fairness it should be mentioned that patients often die from overdoses of an otherwise perfectly harmless drug. This is of course the danger of employing analogies in scientific arguments. But the alternative is of course to use statistics, and this was the original purpose of the analogy – to explain why we find a a small but nevertheless statistically significant effect. One can never really know the true effect of a variable in a regression if its variability is too small relative to the variability of the other factors affecting the dependent variable. 
